Abstract-In an adversarial military environment, it is important to efficiently and promptly predict the enemy's tactical intent from lower level spatial and temporal information. In this paper, we propose a decentralized Markov game (MG) theoretic approach to estimate the belief of each possible enemy Course of Action (ECOA), which is utilized to model the adversary intents. It has the following advantages: 1) It is decentralized. Each cluster or team makes decisions mostly based on local information. We put more autonomies in each group allowing for more flexibilities; 2) A Markov Decision Process (MDP) can effectively model the uncertainties in the noisy military environment; 3) It is a game model with three players: red force (enemies), blue force (friendly forces), and white force (neutral objects); 4) Correlated-Q Reinforcement Learning is integrated. With the consideration that actual value functions are not normally known and they must be estimated, we integrate correlated-Q learning concept in our game approach to dynamically adjust the payoffs function of each player. A simulation software package has been developed to demonstrate the performance of our proposed algorithms. Simulations have verified that our proposed algorithms are scalable, stable, and satisfactory in performance.
INTRODUCTION
Game theory provides a framework for modeling and analyzing various interactions between intelligent and rational decision makers, or players in conflict situations, in which every individual decision maker is not in complete control of other decision units entering into the 1 1 1-4244-0525-4/07/$20.00 ©2007 IEEE. 2 IEEEAC paper #1374, Version 3, Updated on Nov. 27, 2006 environment. The idea of a game can be tracked back to the Babylonian Talmud which is the compilation of ancient law and tradition set down during the first five centuries A.D.. However, it was not until 1944 that the mathematical theory of games was invented by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern [1] .
Mathematically, game theory is used to study strategic situations where players choose different actions in an attempt to maximize their returns, which depend upon the choices of other individuals. To make optimal movement in multi-agent systems, strategies of other agents should be taken into account and therefore it is essential to be able to model the behavior of the opponents.
In an adversarial military environment, it is important to efficiently and promptly predict the enemy's or adversary tactical intent from the lower level spatial (terrain) and temporal information. Standard AI tools for solving decision-making problems in complex situations, such as dynamic decision networks and influence diagrams, are not applicable to these situations. Game theory, on the other hand, provides a mathematical framework designed for the analysis of agent interactions under the assumption of rationality where one tries to identify the game equilibria as opposed to traditional utility maximization principles. A game component in multi-agent decision-making thus uses rationality as a tool to predict the behavior of the other agents [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] .
In this paper, the focus is on the application of Markov Games [2] , the multi-agent extensions of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), to the estimation of enemy course of actions (COAs) [3] , which approximately model the intent of targets. By successfully assessing possible future threats from the adversaries, the decision makers can make more effective targeting decisions, plan friendly COAs, mitigate the impact of unexpected adversary actions, and direct sensing systems to better observe adversary behaviors.
In many cases, the payoff functions of decision makers are not shared among them. For each player, some estimates of opponents must be performed to determine his action strategies. The first learning algorithm for stochastic games was presented by Littman in [17] . Although the introduced off-policy technique is guaranteed to converge, it is limited by the restrictive condition ---the zero-sum payoff structure. Therefore, Hu and Wellman extended Littman's method to non-zero-sum Markov games in [18] . However, the convergence of their method can be guaranteed only under very restrictive conditions. To relax these limitations, Littman proposed a new algorithm in [19] via adding some additional information about the roles of decision makers. But, all those methods were based on Nash strategies, whose existence was not guaranteed.
In this paper, we incorporate a correlated equilibrium [7] based Q-learning method proposed by Greenwald and Hall in [20] . Unlike Nash equilibrium points, which are the concept of equilibria formulated in independent strategies, the correlated equilibria were developed from the correlated strategies in non-cooperative games. The correlated equilibrium of a Markov game describes a solution for playing a dynamic game in which players are able to communicate but are self-interested. It is well known that every Markov game with an autonomous correlated device admits a correlated equilibrium and the correlated equilibrium points can be calculated using linear programming.
ADAPTIVE MARKOV GAME FRAMEWORK
We propose a Markov game (MG) theoretic approach to estimate the belief of each possible enemy COA (ECOA) because 1) It is decentralized. Each cluster or team makes decisions mostly based on the local information. We put more autonomies in each group allowing for more flexibilities; 2) A Markov Decision Process (MDP) can effectively model the uncertainties in the noisy military environment; 3) It is a game model with three players: red force (enemies), blue force (friendly forces), and white force (neutral objects). Game framework is an effective and ideal model to capture the nature of military conflicts: the determination of one side's strategies is tightly coupled to that of the other side's strategies and vice versa. With the consideration that an asymmetric threat (terrorist) may act like a neutral or white object (civilian), we also model the actions of white units in our game framework; 4) Correlated-Q Reinforcement Learning is integrated. With the consideration that actual value functions are not normally known and they must be estimated, we integrate correlated-Q learning concept in our game approach to dynamically adjust the payoffs function of each player.
The game intent inference framework is shown in Fig. 1 . It is constructed from the initial state and evolves according to the transition rule. At each time k, blue and red actions are decided according to the various sensor data, rules of engagement, rationality, terrain information and current state. These actions decide the updated probability distribution over the state space according to the transition rules, which also takes terrain information as one of the inputs. Only one state is selected as the next state. In the real battle, the state is chosen by nature while in our model it is drawn based on the probabilities of all possible states. The bigger the probability is, the easier it will be drawn.
Markov Game for Threat Intent Inference
By definition, a Markov (stochastic) game [18] is given by (i) a finite set of players N ; (ii) a finite set of states S ; (iii) for every player N i ∈ , a finite set of available actions i A (we denote the overall action space . For the intent inference problem, condition (i) is obviously satisfied. Conditions (ii) and (iii) hold because we assume that rules of engagement and terrain information are known and each player has a limited set of COAs given by the doctrines, and terrain information, etc. For example, a river will limit the actions of ground forces. (iv) and (v) are designed according to the specific situations including terrain information. For our threat prediction problem (see Section 3 for an example), we 
And W W S s ∈ is the COAs of White force (neutral objects).
Action Space ---At every time step, each blue group choose a list of targets with associated actions and confidences (probability distribution over the list of targets, i.e., the sum of the confidences should be equal to 1) based on its local battle field information, such as the unit type and positions of possible targets, from level 2 data fusion. Let D is defined as
where
p is the probability of the action-target couple 
where R i p is the probability of action D is defined as
p is the probability of action
Transition rule ---Due to the uncertainty properties of military environments, we assume that the states of the Markov game have inertia so that the decision makers have more chance in pursuit of the objective of the previous actions. We define an inertia factor vector , ,
, are the decisions of player 1 (blue force or friendly force) , player 2 (red force or enemy), and play 3 (white force) respectively, at time step k.
Step 1: with the consideration of inertia factor vector i η , we combine the current state with decisions of both players to obtain fused probability distributions over all possible action-target couples for red and blue forces. 
fighter 2). Secondly, for each specified team, say the th j cluster of player 2 (enemy force), we fuse its action-target couples via modifying the probability of each possible action-target couple based on the following formula 
. Then we know the probability of ) , (
in current state k s is 0 and
according to the definition of inertia, the fused probability of the action-target couple ) , (
.
2) The action-target couple ) , ( to the definition of inertia, the fused probability of the action-target couple ) , (
Similarly, the new probability distribution for the Step 2: we determine the probability distribution over the all possible outcomes of state 1 Otherwise, 0 ) , , , | (
where 1 m is the number of the teams or clusters of player 1 (blue force), 2 m is the number of the teams or groups of player 2 (red force) and 3 m is the number of the units of player 3 (white force).
)} , , {( 
Remark 1: For some asymmetric threats, such as suicide bombers, the payoff functions may only consider the loss of the blue side. For some camouflage, and concealment entities, their objectives are to hide themselves and move close to the blue units. Other deception units will do some irrational movements to hide their true goals with the cost the time.
Remark 2:
The white units only care about their possible losses. For an example, when a dangerous spot is detected, normal white units will find a COA to keep themselves as far as possible from the spot.
The top level payoff functions are used to evaluate the overall performance of each player.
where k is the time index and
is the discount factor for blue, red and white side, respectively. In our approach, the lower lever payoffs are calculated distributedly and sent back to commander/supervisor via communication networks. for white force are different functions, asymmetric force and cost utilities can be straightforwardly represented in our model. In addition, after an irregular adversary is detected, a different type of gain function will be assigned dynamically.
Remark 4:
In our Markov game model, the states used in control strategies is the estimates of the future systems states. These estimates will evaluate or update following the MDPs in the Markov game framework, in which the interactions are considered. At each time k, the process will be repeated based on the observed current system states.
The strategies ---In this paper, we try several well known types of strategies.
Min-max strategies [5] . This kind of strategies will give a conservative solution to minimize the possible maximum "loss". Actually, in our problem, it is a max-min solution in the sense that each player maximizes the possible minimum of his payoffs. So, this kind of strategy is also called safest solution.
Pure Nash Strategies with finite horizon. In game theory, the Nash equilibrium (named after John Nash [6] who proposed it) is an optimal collective strategy in a game involving two or more players, where no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy.
If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium. In our approach, we use a game search tree to find the solution. In our proposed approach, the solution to the Markov game tree is obtained via a K timestep look-ahead approach, in which we only optimize the solution in the K time-step horizon. The suboptimal technique is used successfully for reasoning in games such as chess, backgammon and monopoly.
Mixed Nash Strategies. A mixed strategy is used in game theory to describe a strategy comprised of possible actions and an associated probability, which corresponds to how frequently the action is chosen. Mixed strategy Nash equilibria are equilibria where at least one player is playing a mixed strategy. It was proved by Nash that that every finite game has Nash equilibria but not all have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Correlated Equilibria [7] . Unlike Nash equilibria, which are the concept of equilibria formulated in independent strategies, the correlated equilibria were developed from the correlated strategies in noncooperative games. The correlated equilibrium of a Markov game describes a solution for playing a dynamic game in which players are able to communicate but are self-interested. Sequential Nash Strategies [8] . A sequential game is one in which players choose their strategies following a certain predefined order, and in which at least some players can observe the moves of other players who make decisions preceded them. The sequential game is a natural framework to address some real problems, such as the Action-ReactionCounteraction paradigm used in military intelligence and advertising campaigns strategies of several competing firms in economics. In our approach, we use a turn-by-turn scheme. At each step k, the control strategy from only one player, say, player 1 (blue force), is applied and the corresponding outcome will be observed by player 2 (enemy force) before it decides its next action. This is helpful in estimating the opponent's intent because each time only one action is applied and the state changes from the action is observed.
Leader-Follower Strategies [9] . With the consideration of the limited and non-perfect communication, we use the Stackelberg conception to model the cooperation part between the commander and the local teams. The commander (called the leader) declares incentives to the local teams (called followers) in order to induce them to accept his desired system behavior as the common desired behavior. The Leader-Follower strategy is useful in our clearly defined hierarchical systems which have asymmetric information structures (in our case the leader, or commander know the cost functional of every decision maker, or local teams while the followers know only their own).
Remark 5:
After the experimental and theatric analysis, we prefer the correlated equilibrium strategies since every Markov game with an autonomous correlated device admits a correlated equilibrium. The existence has been proved by Solan and Vieille [7] .
Correlated-Q learning in the Markov Game Model
Until now, we have only discussed the case where the exact model of the environment is known a priori. However, in many situations, we do not have the model available. Fortunately, it is possible to estimate the model from individual on-line samples. In this paper we utilized a correlated-Q reinforcement leaning algorithm to approximate the environment model for payoff functions.
Recall Bellman's equations that characterize the optimal state and action-values for a Markov Decision Process (DMP), which is a one-player Markov game: 
∈ π
As in the MDP, we define the following Q-learning functions for our Markov game model (we assume that the weights
are stationary):
is the vector of the actions for all agents in the blue team. Similarly, ) , , , (
Similarly, we define the functions for Red and White forces,
In this paper, we use the correlated-Q leaning scheme [20] , in which
are the reward of the blue force, red force and white force at the correlated equilibrium [2] , respectively. In our Markov game model, we decide to use the uCE-Q [20] 
satisfies the utilitarian policy, in which the sum of the players' rewards is maximized:
Similarly, the CE-Q learning scheme for Red and White player are shown in (25) and (26), respectively,
To efficiently reason the enemy's intent or COAs, we divide our approach into two phases: training phase and reasoning phase. In the first one, we measure or observe the enemy's actions and compare them with the actions generated by our model. The results are used to tune or adjust the parameters in the Q-learning algorithm. In the reasoning phase, we fix the parameters and use the generated red COAs as the intent of enemy.
SIMULATIONS AND EXPERIMENTS
In the Simulation part, we build a virtual battle-space and a typical urban scenario based on the Ontology concept, which is an explicit, formal, machine-readable semantic model that defines the classes (or concepts) and their possible inter-relations specific to some specified domain. To simulate our data fusion approach, we implemented and tested our battle-space, scenario and algorithms on the MICA Open Environment Platform (OEP) based on the Boeing C4Isim simulation, which models the collection, processing, and dissemination of battlefield information.
We used a scenario shown in Fig. 2 to demonstrate the performance of our proposed threat prediction and situation awareness algorithm. In the shown urban environment, the blue force's missions are to capture two bridges and to do security patrol on the mains roads connecting two bridges. The blue ground force consists of 3 teams of three soldiers each with Sniper Rifles. The red force includes 3 armed fighters and 3 asymmetric adversaries hiding in and acting like the white objects (the civilians and vehicles). We assume there is an asymmetry in total forces between blue side and red side. Blue side has more soldiers than red side. Moreover, the objectives of blue side and red side are asymmetric: the objectives of red side are to kill blue forces without considering the loss of themselves and the consideration of collateral damage. The main challenge for both sides is to understand the situation from the fused For the scenario, in a specific simulation run (Markov game approach with correlated-Q reinforcement leaning algorithm) as shown in Fig. 3 , blue team 1 and blue team 3 were assigned to secure Bridge 1 and Bridge 2, respectively, almost in the whole simulation period of 30 minutes. Blue team 2 was doing security patrol on the two major roads connecting two bridges and some important areas. On the other hand, red fighters and asymmetric adversaries are trying their best to kill blue forces. The first battle happened when Red Fighter 2 tried to attack Blue Team 2 with the help of an asymmetric white vehicle with deception (hiding in white vehicles). During this period, our algorithm detected and killed one asymmetric adversary vehicle with deception. Without the help of the red vehicle, red fighter 2 was killed by blue team 2. Almost at the same time, the asymmetric adversaries near Bridge 1 and Bridge 2 were attacking the blue team 1 and 2. At this stage, two civilians were detected and killed as asymmetric adversaries. Without the helps from the asymmetric adversaries with deceptions, red fighter 1 and 3 (as shown in Fig. 4) were killed by blue team 1 and 3 at bridge 1 and 2, respectively. In this specific run, there is no loss of blue soldiers since our algorithm predicted the intents of the red side correctly and promptly. The performance of the Correlated-Q reinforcement method is shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 . The values on the x-axis represent time steps, and the corresponding y-values are the differences between Q-values. All the blue and red Q-values converge to their optimal policy, respectively.
Fig. 5: Convergence in Blue Q-values
In addition to the explained run, we performed many experiments. We compared the results using the various options, such as without game theoretic threat intent inference, without asymmetric Threat Prediction (with level 2 but the payoff function of game model at level 3 doesn't change dynamically), Game approach with Correlated Strategy (known environment model), game approach with Correlated-Q reinforcement learning algorithm, and the game approach without collateral damage consideration in the cost function of blue side. The results (since the simulation is stochastic, results are the mean of 10 runs for each case) are shown in Fig. 7 (only the damage information of the Blue side is shown). From the damage comparison results, we can see that our proposed Markov game framework with correlated-Q reinforcement learning algorithm for threat detection and situation awareness is better than the other methods. 
CONCLUSIONS
Game theoretic tools have a potential for threat prediction that takes real uncertainties in Red plans and deception possibilities into consideration. In this paper, we have evaluated the feasibility of the advanced adversary intent inference algorithm and their effectiveness through extensive simulations. It has verified that our proposed algorithms are scalable, stable, and perform satisfactorily. 
